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I. INTRODUCTION
On May 3, 1978, the Police Department in Bloomingdale, Illi-
nois, received by mail an anonymous handwritten letter stating
that two local residents, Lance and Sue Gates, were dealing in ille-
gal drugs.' The letter contained a detailed itinerary of the couple's
operations; it alleged that the Gates periodically traveled to Flor-
ida, loaded their car with drugs, then returned to Bloomingdale.'
The letter also predicted the date of the couple's next trip and
stated that they had in their basement drugs worth over
$100,000.00.s The Chief of Police referred the letter to Detective
1. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (1983).
2. Id.
3. The full text of the letter read as follows:
This letter is to inform you that you have a couple in your town who strictly
make their living on selling drugs. They are Sue and Lance Gates, they live on
Greenway, off Bloomingdale Rd. in the condominiums. Most of their buys are
done in Florida. Sue his wife drives their car to Florida, where she leaves it to be
loaded up with drugs, then Lance flies down and drives it back. Sue flies back
after she drops the car off in Florida. May 3 she is driving down there again and
Lance will be flying down in a few days to drive it back. At the time Lance
drives the car back he has the trunk loaded with over $100,000.00 in drugs. Pres-
ently they have over $100,000.00 worth of drugs in their basement.
They brag about the fact they never have to work, and make their entire
living on pushers.
I guarantee if you watch them carefully you will make a big catch. They are
friends with some big drug dealers, who visit their house often.
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Mader, who determined the Gates's exact address." Additionally,
Detective Mader learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare
Airport that Lance Gates had flown to Florida. He also learned
from Drug Enforcement Administration agents that Lance Gates
had checked into a motel room registered to Susan Gates then left
the motel with an unidentified woman.5 The Gates were observed
leaving the motel in a Mercury bearing Illinois license plates and
heading north on an interstate frequently used by travelers to the
Chicago area. Based upon the anonymous letter and upon an affi-
davit signed by him setting forth the results of his independent
investigation, Mader obtained a search warrant for the Gates's res-
idence in Bloomingdale and for their automobile. Two days later,
when the Gates arrived at their home in Bloomingdale,' the
Bloomingdale police served them with the warrant. A search of the
Mercury uncovered approximately 350 pounds of marijuana.8 Upon




4. Id. The office of the Illinois Secretary of State informed Mader that an Illinois
driver's license had been issued to Lance Gates, who resided at a certain address in Bloom-
ingdale. When that address proved to be outdated, Mader contacted a confidential inform-
ant. The informant's investigation of certain financial records disclosed a current address for
the Gates.
The presence of this second informant was irrelevant to the establishment of probable
cause. Comment, Anonymous Tips, Corroboration, and Probable Cause: Reconciling the
Spinelli/Draper Dichotomy in Illinois v. Gates, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 99, 118 n.179 (1982).
5. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2325-26.
[Mader] learned from a police officer assigned to O'Hare Airport that "L. Gates"
had made a reservation on Eastern Airlines flight 245 to West Palm Beach, Fla.,
scheduled to depart from Chicago on May 5 at 4:15 p.m.
Mader then made arrangements with an agent of the Drug Enforcement Ad-
ministration (DEA) for surveillance of the May 5 Eastern Airlines flight. The
agent later reported to Mader that Gates had boarded the flight, and that fed-
eral agents in Florida had observed him arrive in West Palm Beach and take a
taxi to the nearby Holiday Inn. They also reported that Gates went to a room
registered to one Susan Gates and that, at 7:00 a.m. the next morning, Gates and
an unidentified woman left the motel ....
Id. The unidentified woman turned out to be Susan Gates.
6. The DEA agent informed Mader that the license plate number on the Mercury was
registered to a station wagon owned by Gates. The agent also told Mader that the driving
time between Bloomingdale and West Palm Beach was approximately 22 to 24 hours. Id. at
2326.
7. The couple arrived home only 36 hours after Lance Gates had flown out of Chicago
and 22 hours after they checked out of the motel. Id.
8. Id. A search of the Gates's residence uncovered more marijuana, as well as weapons,
ammunition, drug paraphernalia, and several scales presumably used for weighing the drugs.
In addition, the police found cocaine in the Gates's possession. See People v. Gates, 85 Ill.
2d 376, 381, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981); see also Comment, supra note 4, at 118 (detailed
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motion made by the Gates prior to their trial on charges of violat-
ing state drug laws,9 the trial court ordered suppression of all of
the items seized.' 0 The Illinois appellate court affirmed," as did a
divided Illinois Supreme Court.'2 The state supreme court ex-
amined the facts in light of Aguilar v. Texas, 3 which held that an
informant's tip can establish probable cause only if police set forth
the source of the informant's knowledge and their reasons for cred-
iting the informant's veracity. 4 After finding that Mader's affidavit
lacked both elements," the court considered whether the deficien-
cies could be cured under Spinelli v. United States.6 There, the
Supreme Court allowed magistrates to find probable cause where
the details contained in the tip, together with the police corrobora-
tion of the details, established the tip's overall trustworthiness."
The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the affidavit was insuf-
ficient under the Spinelli standards as well, and held the search
invalid.' 8 On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held, re-
versed: The two-prong test of Aguilar and Spinelli for determining
whether an informant's tip establishes probable cause for the issu-
ance of a warrant is abandoned, and the totality of the circum-
stances approach that traditionally has informed probable cause
determinations is reinstated. Accordingly, the Court held that "the
judge issuing the warrant had a 'substantial basis for . .. con-
clud[ing]' that probable cause to search the Gates' home and car
existed.""
discussion of facts in Gates).
9. The defendants argued in their motion to suppress Mader's affidavit that it did not
set forth the underlying circumstances or the manner in which the informant acquired the
information, and furthermore, that it did not set forth Mader's basis for accepting the relia-
bility as Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964), required. People v. Gates, 85 11. 2d 376,
381, 423 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1981). The defendants also argued that the results of Detective
Mader's independent investigation did not corroborate the anonymous informant's accusa-
tions that the Gates were involved in criminal activity so as to support the issuance of a
search warrant based on probable cause. Id.
10. The trial court granted the motion "on the ground that the affidavit submitted to
the Circuit Judge failed to support the necessary determination of probable cause to believe
that the Gates's automobile and home contained the contraband in question." Illinois v.
Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2326.
11. People v. Gates, 82 Ill. App. 3d 749, 403 N.E.2d 77 (1980).
12. People v. Gates, 85 I1. 2d 376, 423 N.E.2d 887 (1981).
13. 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
14. Id. at 114.
15. People v. Gates, 85 11. 2d at 386, 423 N.E.2d at 891.
16. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
17. Id. at 415.
18. People v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d at 389, 423 N.E.2d at 893.
19. Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2336.
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II. EVOLUTION OF THE Aguilar-Spinelli TEST
The backdrop of Gates is a struggle among the members of
the Court with the larger issue whether to modify the exclusionary
rule itself, which the Court evolved in a dozen decisions beginning
with Weeks v. United States. 20 Justice Rehnquist hoped that
Gates would be the vehicle to address this larger issue. However,
on what he thought to be a jurisdictional impediment, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, did not address that issue. 1 The
struggle within the Court seems to be between Justices White and
Rehnquist, who apologized for the inability of the Court to address
the issue,22 and Justice Brennan, who is adamantly against any
modification of the exclusionary rule. His strategy for modifying
the exclusionary rule being presently unavailable, Justice Rehn-
quist instead chose to modify the fourth amendment substantively,
with respect to informants. Thus, Gates was not a product of itself,
but the result of a larger, underlying jurisprudential struggle
within the Court.
The moving force behind the Court's reasoning in Gates was
practicality. The majority repeatedly stressed that probable cause
is a "practical, nontechnical conception."2 The Court reasoned
that the two-prong test of Aguilar, as refined in Spinelli and ap-
plied in subsequent cases, had become unduly rigid and too techni-
cal to serve that concept.24 The Court went too far, however. It was
not necessary for the Supreme Court to overrule Aguilar and
Spinelli. The warrant in Gates could have been upheld within the
Aguilar-Spinelli rubric, while achieving at the same time the prac-
ticality and flexibility that the Court sought. The historical devel-
opment leading up to Gates indicates that the Aguilar and
Spinelli standards were never intended as overly rigid or technical
guidelines; only confusion and misapplication of their standards by
the lower courts produced this result. Accordingly, clarification of
the standards, and perhaps a strong admonishment to the lower
courts, would have sufficed; abandoning a long-standing and neces-
20. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
21. The "jurisdictional impediment" was Justice Rehnquist's interpretation of 28
U.S.C. § 1257, which has been judicially developed to require that an issue be "pressed or
passed upon below." 103 S. Ct. at 2321-24. According to Justice Rehnquist, the issue
whether to modify the exclusionary rule had not been presented to the state courts. Id. at
2324.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 2321.
23. Id. at 2328 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)).
24. Id. at 2328-29.
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sary standard was not the answer. Aguilar and Spinelli have suf-
fered an untimely demise.
A. Pre-Aguilar Development
Half a century ago, in Nathanson v. United States,25 the
Court invalidated a search warrant 26 reasoning that "a warrant to
search a private dwelling may [not] rest upon mere affirmance of
suspicion or belief without disclosure of supporting facts or cir-
cumstances. '2 The Court stated that "Iu]nder the Fourth Amend-
ment, an officer may not properly issue a warrant to search a pri-
vate dwelling unless he can find probable cause therefor from facts
or circumstances presented to him under oath or affirmation. Mere
affirmance of belief or suspicion is not enough. 2' Nathanson, the
genesis of modern probable cause law, has withstood 50 years of
change.
Twenty-five years after Nathanson, in Giordenello v. United
States,9 the Court reviewed an arrest warrant based on the sworn
complaint of a Federal Bureau of Narcotics agent." Based on the
agent's testimony at the suppression hearing, the Court noted that
"until the warrant was issued . . . [the agent's] suspicions of peti-
tioner's guilt derived entirely from information given him by law
enforcement officers and other persons in Houston, none of whom
either appeared before the Commissioner or submitted affida-
vits."3  The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether a war-
rant could be based solely on hearsay information, for the com-
25. 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
26. The search warrant read in pertinent part:
Whereas said Francis B. Laughlin [agent] has stated under his oath that he has
cause to suspect, and does believe that certain merchandise, to wit: Certain li-
quors of foreign origin a more particular description of which cannot be given,
upon which the duties have not been paid, or which has otherwise been brought
into the United States contrary to law, and that said merchandise is not depos-
ited and contained within the premises of J.J. Nathanson said premises being
described as a 2 story frame dwelling, located at 117 No. Bartram Ave .....
Id. at 44.
27. Id. at 47.
28. Id.
29. 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
30. Id. at 481. The complaint read in part:
The undersigned complainant [Finley] being duly sworn states: That on or about
January 26, 1956, at Houston, Texas in the Southern District of Texas, Veto
Giordenello did receive, conceal, etc., narcotic drugs, to-wit: heroin hydrochlo-
ride with knowledge of unlawful importation; in violation of Section 174, Title
21, United States Code.
31. Id. at 485.
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plaint was "defective in not providing a sufficient basis upon which
a finding of probable cause could be made."3 The Court was quick
to identify who was to make this probable cause determination,
however, by citing to Johnson v. United States." In Johnson the
Court stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the sup-
port of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from
evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those infer-
ences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime.3'
The Court in Giordenelto reaffirmed Nathanson"6 by stating
that "[the Commissioner] should not accept without question the
complainant's mere conclusion that the person whose arrest is
sought has committed a crime.""6 Finally, the Court expressly re-
jected the argument that the deficiencies in the warrant could be
cured by "the Commissioner's reliance upon a presumption that
the complaint was made on the personal knowledge of the com-
plaining officer.
' ' s3
In Jones v. United States,38 the Court addressed for the first
time the issue, left undecided in Giordenello, "whether an affidavit
which sets out personal observations relating to the existence of
cause to search is to be deemed insufficient by virtue of the fact
that it sets out not the affiant's observations but those of an-
other."39 The Court held that hearsay information can support the
issuance of a warrant "so long as a substantial basis for crediting
32. Id. The complaint contained no affirmative allegations nor did it indicate any
sources for the agent's conclusion. Id. at 486.
33. 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
34. Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted).
35. 290 U.S. at 41.
36. Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486.
37. Id.
38. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
39. Id. at 269. In Jones, the defendant's apartment was searched pursuant to a warrant
based on an informant's tip. The affidavit, signed by agent Didone of the Narcotic Squad in
the District of Columbia, contained information from an unidentified source that the sus-
pects were involved in narcotics trafficking and that they kept a supply of heroin on hand in
the apartment. The informant also stated that he had purchased narcotics from the suspects
at the apartment. The affidavit went on to state that the informant had previously given




the hearsay is presented. 40
The Jones Court cited Draper v. United States,1 which held
that an officer may rely upon information received through an in-
formant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the
informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other means
within the officer's knowledge.4 The Court reasoned that "[i]f an
officer may act upon probable cause without a warrrant when the
only incriminating evidence in his possession is hearsay, it would
be incongruous to hold that such evidence presented in an affidavit
is insufficient basis for a warrant.
43
The Court found that there was a substantial basis for credit-
ing the hearsay involved in Jones. The Court stressed that the in-
formant's report was based on his personal knowledge, and that he
had provided accurate information in the past." The Court also
pointed out that the defendant was known to the police to be a
narcotics user, and thus "the charge against him [was] much less
subject to scepticism than would be such a charge against one
without such a history. '40 Finally, the Court put much weight on
the fact that "[c]orroboration through other sources of information
reduced the changes of a reckless or prevaricating tale ....
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the substantial
basis test in Rugendorf v. United States.47 In Rugendorf, an in-
40. Id. at 269.
41. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
42. Id. at 313.
43. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 270. The Court further reasoned that "[i]f evi-
dence of a more judicially competent or persuasive character than would have justified an
officer in acting on his own without a warrant must be presented when a warrant is sought,
warrants could seldom legitimize police conduct, and resort to them would ultimately be
discouraged." Id.
44. Id. at 271.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Court in Jones noted one more important point. Citing to Draper, the
Court reiterated that there is a "difference between what is required to prove guilt in a
criminal case and what is required to show probable cause for arrest or search . . . .There
is a large difference between the two things to be proved [guilt and probable cause] . . . and
therefore a like difference in the quanta and modes of proof required to establish them."
Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. at 311-12 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 173 (1949)).
As early as Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813), Chief Justice Mar-
shall observed that "the term 'probable cause,' according to its usual acceptation, means less
than evidence which would justify condemnation .... " Id. at 348. In more recent times,
the Court has stated that "only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal
activity is the standard of probable cause ...." Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419
(1969) (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964)).
47. 376 U.S. 528 (1964).
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formant provided a detailed description of allegedly stolen furs
that he had seen in the defendant's basement.48 An independent
police investigation corroborated the information. 9 The Court,
while emphasizing the amount of detail present in the affidavit,
held that the affidavit presented a substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay.50 The stage was thus set for Aguilar and Spinelli.
B. Aguilar and Spinelli
The formulation of rigid guidelines for establishing probable
cause originated in the seminal case of Aguilar v. Texas." The case
marked a departure from the vague substantial basis test applied
in Jones and Rugendorf.52 In considering a search warrant based
on hearsay,5 3 the Court reviewed Nathanson and GiordeneUo; it
acknowledged the requirement established by those cases that an
officer provide the magistrate with the underlying facts or circum-
stances that support the officer's conclusion that there is probable
cause to justify the issuance of a warrant."4 While recognizing that
48. The affidavit stated that the informant's detailed description included the number
and type of the stolen furs and that another informer knew the defendant as a "fence." Id.
at 532.
49. Among the information corroborated was the fact that this Alabama burglary was
the only recent one in the United States involving furs of the description and number that
the informant saw in the defendant's basement. Id.
50. Id. at 532-33. The defendant in Rugendorf depended on certain factual inaccuracies
in 'order to destroy the probable cause determination; i.e., the allegations in the affidavit
that the defendant was the manager of Rugendorf Brothers Meat Market and that he was
associated with his brother Leo in the meat business. The Court held, however, that these
factual inaccuracies were of only peripheral relevancy to the showing of probable cause, and,
not being within the personal knowledge of the affiant, did not go to the integrity of the
affidavit. Id. at 532.
The Court also held that "so long as there [is] a substantial basis for crediting the
hearsay" the identity of the informant(s) need not be disclosed. Id. at 533 (quoting Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. at 272).
51. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Aguilar was decided the same year as Rugendorf.
52. See Note, Use of an Informant's Tip in Establishing Probable Cause, 56 NEB. L.
REv. 883, 886 (1977).
53. The warrant was obtained upon the basis of an affidavit which, in relevant part,
recited that: "Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do be-
lieve that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotics paraphernalia
are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to
the provisions of the law." Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109.
The record did not reveal, nor was it ever claimed, that any other information was
brought to the attention of the Justice of the Peace who issued the warrant. "It is elemen-
tary that in passing on the validity of a warrant, the reviewing court may consider only
information brought to the magistrate's attention." Id. at n.1 (citing Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958)).
54. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112-13. The Court continued:
The vice in the present affidavit is at least great as in Nathanson and Gior-
[Vol. 38:875
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a warrant may be based on hearsay, the Court articulated the fol-
lowing two-prong test:
[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underly-
ing circumstances from which the informant concluded that the
narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the un-
derlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that
the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed (citation
omitted) was "credible" or his information "reliable."55
The Court reasoned that if warrants were to be issued on the
basis of the information provided in Aguilar, then the inferences
from the facts that led to the complaint would not be drawn "by a
neutral and detached magistrate," as the Constitution has been in-
denello. Here, the "mere conclusion" that petitioner possessed narcotics was not
even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified informant. The
affidavit here not only "contains no affirmative allegations that the affliant spoke
with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein," it does not even con-
tain an "affirmative allegation" that the affiant's unidentified source "spoke with
personal knowledge." For all that appears, the source here merely suspected, be-
lieved or concluded that there were narcotics in petitioner's possession. The
magistrate here certainly could not "judge for himself the persuasiveness of the
facts relied on ...to show probable cause." He necessarily accepted "without
question" the informant's "suspicion," "belief" or "mere conclusion."
Id. at 113-14 (footnote omitted).
The Court noted that "[t]o approve this affidavit would open the door to easy circumven-
tion of the rule announced in Nathanson and Giordenello." Id. at 114 n.4.
55. Id. at 114. The prongs from the test established in Aguilar have become known as
the "basis of knowledge" prong and the "veracity" prong. The "veracity" prong has a "cred-
ibility" spur and a "reliability" spur. An informant's "credibility" concerns more his inher-
ent character as a person-his reputation for truth or his demonstrated history of telling the
truth. "Reliability," on the other hand, is distinct from the "credibility" of the source; it
seemingly involves circumstances assuring trustworthiness on the particular occasion when
the information is furnished. Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and
Spinelli Primer, 25 MERCER L. REV. 741, 761 (1974).
Aguilar fails to clearly indicate whether the "veracity" prong, with its two spurs, is
disjunctive or conjunctive. In other words, will the satisfaction of one spur satisfy the whole
prong or must both spurs be satisfied in order to satisfy the "veracity" prong? See Note,
The Informer's Tip As Probable Cause for Search or Arrest, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 958, 960
n.10 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, The Informer's Tip]. The conclusion has been, how-
ever, that the "veracity" prong is disjunctive. See LaFave, Probable Cause From Infor-
mants: The Effects of Murphy's Law on Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 1977 U. ILL. L.F.
1, 5; Comment, An Informant's Tip As The Basis for Probable Cause: Modified Aguilar
Standards, 20 S.D.L. REV. 363, 364 (1975).
The "basis of knowledge" and "veracity" prongs are conjunctive, however. Both prongs
must be satisfied in order to meet the test established in Aguilar. For a discussion on how
Aguilar developed from Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959), and Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), see Note, Spinelli v. United States: Searching For Probable
Cause, 30 U. PiTr. L. REV. 735, 737 (1968-1969) [hereinafter cited as Note, Searching for
Probable Cause].
1984]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
terpreted to require.5 6 Instead, those inferences would be drawn by
a police officer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of fer-
reting out crime." '' The magistrate would in effect be accepting
the police officer's judgment rather than his own, or worse yet, he
would be accepting the judgment of an unidentified informer. The
Court reversed, concluding that the warrant should not have been
issued because the affidavit did not provide a sufficient basis for a
finding of probable cause.58
In dissent, Justice Clark warned that "the Court has substi-
tuted a rigid, academic formula for the unrigid standards of rea-
sonableness and 'probable cause' laid down by the Fourth Amend-
ment itself-a substitution of technicality for practicality . . .,59
Aguilar should not be read like that, however. The Court intended
neither a rigid, inflexible compartmentalization of the inquiries
into an informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis of knowl-
edge," nor that these inquiries be elaborate exegeses of an inform-
ant's tip. Rather, the Court required that only some of the facts
bearing on two particular issues be provided in order to guide the
magistrate's determination of probable cause.60
Illustrating this point is United States v. Ventresca.6 ' Defen-
56. The fourth amendment provides the governing standards:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST., amend. IV; see, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453 (1971)
(Constitution requires a neutral and detached magistrate).
57. Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 115 (citing Giordenello, 357 U.S. at 486; Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
58. Id. at 115-16.
59. Id. at 122 (Clark, J., dissenting).
60. See Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328 n.6 (1983); cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 109 (1965) (the affidavit set forth "not merely 'some of the underlying circumstances'
supporting the officer's belief, but a good many of them") (emphasis added).
61. 380 U.S. 102 (1965). In Ventresca a search warrant was issued upon an affidavit
reciting that the request for a search warrant was based on observations made by the affiant,
an Internal Revenue Service investigator, and "upon information received officially from
other investigators attached to the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division ... and reports
orally made to [the affiant] describing the results of their observations and investigation
..... " Id. at 103-04. The affidavit also described seven different occasions when a specified
automobile made deliveries to the suspect's house, the contents of the automobile on each
occasion, the dates and times when the investigators reported the smell of fermenting mash
emanating from the suspect's residence, and the dates when sounds similar to a motor or a
pump were heard coming from the house. The affidavit concluded: "The foregoing informa-
tion is based upon personal knowledge and information which has been obtained from In-
vestigators of the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, Internal Revenue Service, who have
[Vol. 38:875
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dant Ventresca was convicted of possessing and operating an illegal
distillery. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, 2 holding
that the affidavit failed to pass the basis of knowledge test of Agui-
lar. The court reasoned that because the affidavit did not assert
that the affiant or other investigators had personal knowledge,
then the information obtained from the other investigators could
have been untrustworthy hearsay.6 3
The Supreme Court reversed;64 Justice Goldberg held that
magistrates and courts must test affidavits for search warrants in a
common-sense manner, without senseless technical requirements.6 5
The Supreme Court went on to admonish the court of appeals for
"misapprehend[ing] its judicial function reviewing this affidavit by
giving it an unduly technical and restrictive reading." 6 Thus, the
Supreme Court laid a predicate; Aguilar was not to be applied
restrictively.
In Ventresca, the Supreme Court evidently incorporated the
"sufficient detail" analysis of Rugendorf into the "underlying cir-
cumstances" test of Aguilar.7 The detailed descriptions contained
in the affidavit influenced the Court to uphold the warrant. The
Court reasoned that these details,68 if read in a common-sense
manner, would be sufficient to assure a magistrate that the source
was credible and the information reliable, and to supply a suffi-
cient basis for establishing probable cause. 9 It is arguable, then,
because the Court in Ventresca placed so much emphasis on the
desirability of a practical, nontechnical approach, that it applied a
totality of circumstances test. But Ventresca would have satisfied
the two-pronged test because "basis of knowledge" and "veracity"
were established. Thus, Ventresca produced uncertainty as to
whether Aguilar must be applied literally or whether one or both
been assigned to this investigation." Id. at 104. A search made under the warrant led to an
illegal still. Id. at 103.
62. Ventresca v. United States, 324 F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1963).
63. Id. at 868-70.
64. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
65. Id. at 108.
66. Id. at 111.
67. Note, supra note 52, at 888.
68. The Court stated that the affidavit at issue in Ventresca was more detailed and
specific than the one in Aguilar. Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 109.
69. Id. The Court indicates that the "veracity" prong was satisfied because IRS investi-
gators are presumed to be truthful. Id. at 111. Furthermore, the "basis of knowledge" prong
was apparently met because at least some of the information was stated to be derived from
the personal observations of other investigators. This included the smell of mash and sounds
of a running motor. Id. at 110-11.
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of its requirements could be ignored if common sense indicated
that a tip provided probable cause.7
This uncertainty was addressed in Spinelli v. United States.71
In Spinelli, the Court reviewed a search warrant based on an affi-
davit that was "more ample" than the one in Aguilar.72 The affida-
vit in Spinelli contained not only a tip from a confidential, reliable
informant,7 but also a report of an independent police investiga-
tion that allegedly corroborated the informant's tip.74 The Court
deemed the informant's tip75 the fundamental item in the affidavit
and isolated this factor in its analysis.76 Rejecting of the "totality
of circumstances" approach taken by the court of appeals,7 the
70. See Note, The Informer's Tip, supra note 55, at 961. Justice Goldberg probably
meant that common sense should be used in determining whether sufficient circumstances
have been set forth to pass each of the tests required by Aguilar. Id. at n.20.
The dissent in Ventresca warned that "[there is not a single statement in the affidavit
that could well be hearsay or some other multiple form of hearsay." Ventresca, 380 U.S. at
122 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
72. Id. at 413.
73. While the affiant swore that the informant was reliable, he presented no such evi-
dence to the magistrate. Id. at 416.
74. The Court stated that the relevant portions of the affidavit were:
1) The FBI had kept track of Spinelli's movements on five days during the
month of August 1965. On four of these occasions, Spinelli was seen crossing one
of two bridges leading from Illinois into St. Louis, Missouri, between 11 a.m. and
12:15 p.m. On four of the five days, Spinelli was also seen parking his car in a lot
used by residents of an, apartment house at 1108 Indian Circle Drive in St.
Louis, between 3:30 p.m. and 4:45 p.m. On one day, Spinelli was followed further
and seen to enter a particular apartment in the building.
2) An FBI check with the telephone company revealed that this apartment con-
tained two telephones under the name of Grace P. Hagan, and carrying the
numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136.
3) The application stated that "William Spinelli is known to this affiant and to
federal law enforcement agents and local law enforcement agents as a book-
maker, an associate of bookmakers, a gambler, and an associate of gamblers."
4) Finally it stated that the FBI "has been informed by a confidential reliable
informant that William Spinelli is operating a handbook and accepting wagers
and disseminating wagering information by means of the telephones which have
been assigned the numbers WYdown 4-0029 and WYdown 4-0136."
Id. at 413-14. For the full text of the affidavit, see id. at 420-22.
75. The tip was a statement that gambling was taking place.
76. Id. at 414. The Court reasoned that:
Without it [the informant's tip] probable cause could not be established. The
first two items reflect only innocent-seeming activity and data. Spinelli's travels
to and from the apartment building and his entry into a particular apartment on
one occasion could hardly be taken as bespeaking gambling activity; and there is
surely nothing unusual about an apartment containing two separate telephones.
Many a householder indulges himself in this petty luxury.
Id.
77. Spinelli v. United States, 382 F.2d 871, 880 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc). The Supreme
[Vol. 38:875
ILLINOIS v. GATES
court held that the informant's tip alone must first be measured
against the Aguilar standards. 7 Applying the basis of knowledge
test, Justice Harlan noted that the affidavit lacked any explanation
of the underlying circumstances from which the informer con-
cluded that Spinelli was running a gambling operation.a There
was no allegation that the informer had seen Spinelli at work or
that he had placed a bet with him. 0 Nor was there a statement
that the informer had obtained his information from another relia-
ble source.8' Moving to the reliability test, the majority noted that
the affidavit gave no reason for believing that the informer was re-
liable.82 There was a bald assertion of reliability but no mention of
previous tips.
8 3
Because the tip failed to meet the Aguilar test alone, the
Court approved two additional ways of satisfying that test. First,
the Court suggested that if the tip contained sufficient detail
describing the criminal activity of the accused, it might satisfy the
basis of knowledge prong.84 Such detail might assure the magis-
trate that he is "relying on something more substantial than a cas-
ual rumor circulating in the underworld or an accusation based
merely on an individual's general reputation. 85 The Court stated
that "[t]he detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United
States ...provides a suitable benchmark"86 because "[a] magis-
trate, when confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer
that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way."
8 7
Court contradicted itself, however, by adding that "[t]his is not to say that the tip was so
insubstantial that it could not properly have counted in the magistrate's determination.
Rather, it needed some further support." Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 418.
78. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 415.





84. Id. (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). Detail may also satisfy the
reliability spur of the veracity prong. See id. at 417. For a discussion of why detail should
not satisfy the veracity prong, see Lafave, supra note 55, at 42-49.
The Court noted some dissimilarity between probable cause for issuance of a warrant
by a magistrate and probable cause required for the arrest in Draper. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at
417 n.5. Furthermore, there is evidence that the Court was blurring the two part test by
using Draper as an example of basis of knowledge or reliability. Id. at 416.
85. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416. For a discussion of why the self-verifying detail test
should be discarded, see Note, The Informer's Tip, supra note 55, at 966.
86. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-17 (citation omitted).
87. Id. at 417 (footnote omitted). In Draper the FBI's informer (1) stated that Draper
would arrive in Denver on the train from Chicago on the morning of the eighth or ninth of
September, (2) described Draper's appearance and how he would be dressed, (3) stated that
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The Court held, however, that the tip in Spinelli did not meet the
Draper standard. "Here, the only facts supplied were that Spinelli
was using two specified telephones and that these phones were be-
ing used in gambling operations. This meager report could easily
have been obtained from an offhand remark heard at a neighbor-
hood bar."88
Second, the Court stated that police corroboration of the de-
tails of an informant's tip could satisfy the veracity prong.89 Jus-
tice White stated in concurrence that "because an informant is
right about some things, he is more probably right about other
facts, usually the critical, unverifiable facts."9 Justice Harlan then
went on to consider whether "the tip . . . when certain parts of it
have been corroborated by independent sources, is as trustworthy
as a tip [that] would pass Aguilar's tests without independent cor-
roboration."91 The Court held, however, that because the FBI had
corroborated only the phone numbers taken from its investigation
of telephone company records, there was insufficient corroboration
to establish the informer's reliability.9 2 By stating that "the tip
needed some further support," although it "could . . . properly
Draper walked with a fast gait, (4) stated that he would be carrying a tan zipper bag, and
(5) stated that he would be carrying three ounces of heroin. Draper, 358 U.S. at 309. On the
second morning specified by the informant, the police saw a man with the exact appearance
and attributes described by the informant alight from an incoming Chicago train. The man
was carrying a tan zipper bag as the informant had predicted. The police arrested him and
in the ensuing search incident to arrest found the heroin. Id. at 309-10.
The Court in Draper found that the arrest had been based on probable cause. Having
verified every detail of the tip, except whether Draper possessed heroin, the police "had
'reasonable grounds' to believe that the remaining unverified bit of Hereford's [the inform-
ant] information ... was likewise true." Id. at 313. The Court also placed great weight on
the fact that the informer gave reliable information in the past. Id.; cf. Justice White's con-
currence in Spinelli: "[Ihf what Draper stands for is that the existence of the tenth and
critical fact is made sufficiently probable to justify the issuance of a warrant by verifying
nine other facts coming from the same source, I have my doubts about that case." Id. at
426-27.
88. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 417.
89. Id. The Court's opinion on this issue is not clear because it appears to suggest that
corroboration can satisfy both the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs of Aguilar. Id. at
417. Because veracity was not at issue in Draper-the informant had given reliable informa-
tion in the past-the opinion in Spinelli, therefore, might be read as suggesting that corrob-
oration could also satisfy Aguilar's basis of knowledge test. The acceptance has been mixed.
Corroboration has been used to satisfy both prongs. See Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. at 2349
n.22 (White, J., concurring); Lafave, supra note 55, at 54-59. Contra Illinois v. Gates, 103 S.
Ct. at 2354-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note 55, at 368.
90. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 427.
91. Id. at 415.
92. Id. at 417-18.
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have counted in the magistrate's determination, 3 Spinelli hints
that police must corroborate activity that is suggestive of criminal
conduct before finding that probable cause exists.14 The Court gen-
erated confusion, however, by citing Draper, a case where police
only corroborated details of innocent activity. 5 Justice White, con-
curring, disagreed with the majority's application of Draper. He
believed that under Draper the warrant in Spinelli should have
been upheld.9
The Spinelli Court attempted to alleviate the difficulties en-
countered in applying the Aguilar two-pronged test. Instead, it
raised the question of the amount of specificity needed for a tip to
become self-verifying, and of the extent to which an informant's
tip must be corroborated in order to satisfy the veracity prong. In
addition, the Court underscored the issue whether the corrobora-
tion of innocent or incriminating details was necessary. 7
93. Id. at 418.
94. See id.
95. For a discussion on whether the corroborated facts may be innocent-seeming or
should be suggestive of criminal activity, see Lafave, supra note 55, at 46-67 (suggesting
that corroborated facts of criminal activity should count for much more than corroborated
facts of innocent activity in a probable cause determination); Project, Twelfth Annual Re-
view of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 1981-
1982, 71 GEo. L.J. 339, 358 n.56 (1982) (discussing this issue in light of the Spinelli Court's
use of Draper).
96. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 428. For a discussion on this point and on Justice White's
concurrence as a whole, see Note, Searching for Probable Cause, supra note 55, at 739-41.
Justice White concurred with the result because a dissenting vote would have produced
an equally divided Court, resulting in the affirmance of the Eight Circuit's opinion with
which he disagreed. Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 428-29.
The dissent warned that "the Court is moving . . . toward the holding that no magis-
trate can issue a warrant unless according to some unknown standard of proof he can be
persuaded that the suspect defendant is actually guilty of a crime." Id. at 435 (Black, J.,
dissenting).
97. See Comment, supra note 4, at 105.
There are indications that the Court, as well as a large part of the Justice Department,
believed that the "confidential informant" in Spinelli was in fact a tap on the two telephone
lines. This suspicion may account for the surprising strictness with which the Spinelli Court
interpreted the Aguilar test. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 237 n.c. (4th ed. 1974).
After Spinelli and subsequent cases, a picture developed of the many different ways
that Aguilar's two-pronged test could be satisfied. Generally speaking, the "veracity" prong
could be satisfied by a recitation in the affidavit that the informant previously supplied
accurate information to the police, see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 303-04 (1967), by
proof that the informant gave his information against his penal interests, see United States
v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1971) (plurality opinion) or by police corroboration, as
Spinelli held. The "reliability" spur of the "veracity" prong is satisfied if enough detail is
advanced in order to infer reliability. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 417.
The "basis of knowledge" prong is satisfied by a statement from the informant that he
personally observed the criminal activity, or, if he came by the information indirectly, by a
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III. Illinois v. Gates
Illinois v. Gates 8 is significant for at least three reasons. First,
the Supreme Court for the first time "squarely addressed the ap-
plication of the Aguilar and Spinelli standards to tips from anony-
mous informants." 99 Second, the Court abandoned the Aguilar-
Spinelli standard in favor of a "totality of circumstances" ap-
proach' for determining whether an informant's tip establishes
probable cause for issuance of a warrant. 00 Third, the decision is
just one more indication of this Court's willingness to compromise
those rights that the fourth amendment was intended to protect.' 0 '
The theme reiterated throughout the majority opinion is that
probable cause is a "practical, nontechnical conception."102 The
Court reasoned that the two-pronged test enunciated in Aguilar, as
refined in Spinelli and applied in subsequent cases, had become
unduly rigid and too technical to serve that concept; 0 3 it believed
that the Illinois Supreme Court's decision was just another exam-
ple of this trend. Justice Rehnquist stated that the state supreme
court, like others, had "apparently understood Spinelli as requir-
ing that the anonymous letter satisfy each of two independent re-
quirements" [the veracity and basis of knowledge prongs] before it
could be relied on."'1 4 However, the Supreme Court points out that
these requirements, although relevant to a probable cause determi-
nation, need not be met in every case:
We agree with the Illinois Supreme Court that an inform-
ant's "veracity," "reliability" and "basis of knowledge" are all
highly relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not
agree, however, that these elements should be understood as en-
tirely separate and independent requirements to be rigidly ex-
satisfactory explanation of why his sources were reliable, or by a description of the activity
of the accused in sufficient detail. Id. at 416.
98. 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983).
99. Id. at 2356. The Court did, however, in dictum, address this issue in Adams v. Wil-
liams, 407 U.S. 143, 146-47 (1972). That case, however, dealt with the Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968), stop-and-frisk exception to the warrant requirement.
100. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
101. For another case, handed down in the same term as Gates, where the Court weak-
ened fourth amendment protections, see United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 103 S. Ct.
2573 (1983) (customs officials, acting without any suspicion of wrongdoing, did not violate
the fourth amendment by boarding and searching vessel). Justice Rehnquist wrote for the
majority in both Gates and Villamonte-Marquez.
102. 103 S. Ct. at 2328, (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
103. Id. at 2328-29.
104. Id. at 2326-27.
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acted in every case .... 05
Rather, under the "totality of circumstances" approach those fac-
tors "should be understood simply as closely intertwined issues
that may usefully illuminate the commonsense, practical question
"M06whether there is 'probable cause' ... -
Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated that the
"totality of circumstances" approach is far more consistent with
the Court's prior treatment of probable cause than is the two-
pronged test of Aguilar and Spinelli.07 Probable cause is a "fluid
concept . . . not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of
legal rules."' 08 The two-pronged test, the Court asserted, "has en-
couraged an excessively technical dissection of informants' tips,
with undue attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot
sensibly be divorced from the other facts presented to the magis-
trate."109 However, under the "totality of circumstances" approach,
"a deficiency in one [prong] may be compensated for .. .by a
strong showing as to the other .. "..110 The Court believed that it
was incongruous to have "[tiechnical requirements of elaborate
specificity" when most "affidavits 'are normally drafted by non-
lawyers in the midst and haste of a criminal investigation.' """ The
Court's concern is that nonlawyers will not remain abreast of each
judicial refinement in the definition of probable cause.
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the societal eq-
uities involved. It concluded that the continued use of non-flexible
standards would greatly affect society. Police might resort to war-
rantless searches, the Court reasoned, and this is not preferred be-
cause "the possession of a warrant . . . greatly reduces the public
perception of unlawful or intrusive police conduct . . . .,,s Fur-
thermore, "the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli
poorly serves 'the most basic function of any government': 'to pro-
vide for the security of the individual and of his property.' """ The
Court reasoned that the two-pronged test would seriously impede
105. Id. at 2327-28.
106. Id. at 2328 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965)).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2330. The Court cited numerous cases where courts have been unduly tech-
nical and rigid in their application of Aguilar and Spinelli. See id. at 2326-27 n.3, 2328 n.5,
2329 n.8, 2330 n.9.
110. Id. at 2329.
111. Id. at 2330 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 2331.
113. Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 539 (1966) (White, J., dissenting)).
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the task of law enforcement by diminishing the value of inform-
ant's tips, which "frequently contribute to the solution of other-
wise 'perfect crimes,' "114 in police work. Reflecting this preference
for the warrant requirement and for the continued security of soci-
ety the Court set forth the following standard:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and
"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence will be
found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a "substantial basis for
...conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed." 5
Applying the newly announced standard, the Court reversed
the Illinois Supreme Court and upheld the warrant in Gates. Reaf-
firming the value of corroboration of details of an informant's tip,
the Court held that "[t]he showing of probable cause in the pre-
sent case was fully as compelling as that in Draper. Even standing
alone, the facts obtained through the independent investigation of
Mader and the DEA at least suggested that the Gates were in-
volved in drug trafficking." 6 Justice Rehnquist stated that in de-
termining the informant's reliability the magistrate could have re-
lied "on the anonymous letter, which had been corroborated in
major part by Mader's efforts-just as had occurred in Draper. 1117
114. 103 S. Ct. at 2332.
115. Id. at 2332 (quoting in part Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)).
116. 103 S. Ct. at 2334. The Court reasoned that Florida, in addition to being a popular
vacation site, is known as a source of drugs. Furthermore, Lance Gates's flight to Palm
Beach, his brief overnight stay, and his immediate return to Chicago in the family car,
which was conveniently awaiting in Palm Beach, is as suggestive of a drug run, as it is of a
vacation. Id.
117. Id. at 2334-35. The Court pointed out that the Illinois Supreme Court tried to
distinguish Draper by stating that Draper involved an informant who had given reliable
information in the past, while the reliability of the informant in Gates was unknown to the
police. The Court rebutted by stating that:
While this distinction might be an apt one at the time the police department
received the anonymous letter, it became far less significant after Mader's inde-
pendent investigative work occurred. The corrobation of the letter's predictions
• ..all indicated, albeit not with certainty, that the informant's other assertions
also were true.
Id. at 2335.
The Court also pointed out that the Illinois Supreme Court had concluded that the
verification of details in Gates amounted only to "the corroboration of innocent activity"
and thus was insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Id. at n.13 (citation omit-
ted). The Court responded by noting that all of the corroborated detail in Draper was of
entirely innocent activity. Id. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that because probable cause
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Corroboration reduced the chances that the informant gave un-
truthful equivocal information.""" Finally, Justice Rehnquist rea-
soned that "the anonymous letter contained a range of details re-
lating not just to easily obtained facts . . . but to future actions of
third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.""' 9 The Court stated
that where an informant had access to this type of accurate infor-
mation, "it was not unlikely that he also had access to reliable in-
formation of the Gates' alleged illegal activities."' 2 0 Therefore, the
Court resolved, "the judge issuing the warrant had a 'substantial
basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that probable cause to search the
Gates' home and car existed.''2
Justice White, concurring, reasoned that it was not necessary
to abandon the two-pronged test. Although he agreed with the ma-
jority that the warrant in Gates should be upheld, he reached his
conclusion within the Aguilar and Spinelli framework.' 22 Justice
White agreed with the Court that "some lower courts have been
applying Aguilar-Spinelli in an unduly rigid manner"; however, he
believed that clarification of the rule better served their responsi-
bility in this area.
123
Justice Brennan wrote separately to dissent from what he
called "the Court's unjustified and ill-advised rejection" of Aguilar
and Spinelli.2 4 After reviewing the opinions in Nathanson and Gi-
ordenelIo, he concluded that "[i]f the conclusory allegations of a
police officer are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause,
surely the conclusory allegations of an informant should a fortiori
be insufficient.' 25 While the rules drawn from Jones, Aguilar, and
Spinelli are cast in procedural terms, according to Justice Brennan
they do advance an important underlying substantive value:
"Findings of probable cause, and attendant intrusions, should not
required only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, innocent behavior fre-
quently will provide the basis for a showing of probable cause; the relevant inquiry is not
whether particular conduct is "innocent" or "guilty" but the degree of suspicion that at-
taches to particular types of noncriminal acts. Id.
118. Id. at 2335.
119. Id.; see supra note 3. The Court went on to state that "the letter writer's accurate
information as to the travel plans of each of the Gates was of a character likely obtained
only from the Gates themselves, or from someone familiar with their not entirely ordinary
travel plans." 103 S. Ct. at 2335.
120. 103 S. Ct. at 2335 (footnote omitted).
121. Id. at 2336.
122. Id. at 2347-50 (White, J., concurring).
123. Id. at 2350-51 (footnote omitted).
124. Id. at 2351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 2352.
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be authorized unless there is some assurance that the information
on which they are based has been obtained in a reliable way by an
honest or credible person. '  Because affidavits based on hearsay
require a more difficult inquiry 2 7 in order to ensure greater accu-
racy, "[t]he standards announced by Aguilar, as refined by
Spinelli fulfill that need." '128 Justice Brennan concluded that "the
Court's rejection of Aguilar and Spinelli and its adoption of a new
totality of the circumstances test . . 'may fortell an evisceration
of the probable cause standard . . ..
126. Id. at 2355.
127. When the police rely on personal knowledge, requiring them to disclose that
knowledge is no burden. When the police rely on information from confidential informants,
requiring the police to disclose facts on which the informants based their conclusions im-
poses a more substantial burden on the police. It is, however, one that they can meet be-
cause they presumably have access to their confidential informants. But in cases where the
police rely on information obtained from an anonymous informant, the police, by hypothe-
sis, cannot obtain further information about the informant's reliability, honesty, basis of
knowledge, etc., and therefore provide the magistrate with all the information on which they
have based their conclusion. See id. at 2356 n.6. Hence, there is no basis for assuming that
an anonymous informant has obtained his information in a reliable way. Id. at 2356.
128. Id. at 2355.
129. Id. at 2359 (quoting Justice White's concurring opinion at 2334). Before conclud-
ing, however, Justice Brennan took time to counter some of the majority's arguments. He
began by stating that "Aguilar and Spinelli preserve the role of magistrates as independent
arbiters of probable cause . . . . Neither the standards nor their effects are inconsistent
with a 'practical, nontechnical' conception of probable cause." Id. at 2357. Hence, the dis-
sent believed that the totality of circumstances standard would downgrade the role of the
neutral magistrate while eliminating an effective structure within which to make their prob-
able cause determinations. The majority rebutted by stating that nothing in its opinion "les-
sens the authority of the magistrate to draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the
material supplied to him by applicants for a warrant." Id. at 2333. Indeed, the majority
concluded, the magistrate "is freer than under the regime of Aguilar and Spinelli to draw
such inferences, or to refuse to draw them if he is so minded." Id. Similarly, the majority
added, the magistrate may exact whatever assurances he deems necessary.
Justice Brennan's dissent differed with the majority's reasoning that Aguilar and
Spinelli should be abandoned because they are inconsistent with the fact that non-lawyers
frequently serve as magistrates. Id. at 2330-31. On the contrary, the dissent reasoned that
"the (Aguilar and Spinelli] standards help to structure probable cause inquiries and, prop-
erly interpreted, may actually help a non-lawyer magistrate in making a probable cause
determination." Id. at 2358. To the majority's supposition that rigorous scrutiny of affida-
vits will lead police to resort to warrantless searches with the hope of relying on consent or
some other exception to the warrant requirement, id. at 2331, the dissent responded by
citing the holding in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971), that unconsti-
tutional searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amendment. Thus, the officer
must carry the heavy burden of showing the exigencies which made that course of conduct
imperative. Id. at 2358 n.9 (citation omitted). Furthermore, of particular interest to the dis-
sent was the majority's theory that "the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli
poorly serves 'the most basic function of any government': 'to provide for the security of the
individual and of his property.'" Id. at 2331 (citation omitted). Justice Brennan attacked
this theory by reasoning that "of particular concern to all Americans must be that the Court
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Justice Stevens also wrote separately. His dissent concentrated
on the significance of an inaccuracy in the anonymous letter.130 He
believed that the discrepancy was significant because it cast doubt
on the informant's hypothesis that there was contraband in the
Gates's basement,13 1 it made the Gates's conduct seem less un-
usual,"3 2 and it undermined the reasonableness of relying on the
letter as a basis for making a forcible entry into a private home. 3'
gives virtually no consideration to the value of insuring that findings of probable cause are
based on information that a magistrate can reasonably say has been obtained in a reliable
way by an honest or credible person." Id. at 2359.
Finally, the Brennan dissent stated that the majority's use of words such as "practical,"
"nontechnical," and "commonsense" are but "code words for an overly permissive attitude
towards police practices in derogation of the rights secured by the fourth amendment." Id.
To this the majority rebutted that although it is true that only measures consistent with the
fourth amendment may be employed by the government to cure the horrors of drug traffick-
ing, see id. at 2359,
"[flidelity" to the commands of the Constitution suggests balanced judgment
rather than exhortation. The highest "fidelity" is achieved neither by the judge
who instinctively goes furthest in upholding even the most bizzare claim of indi-
vidual constitutional rights, any more than it is achieved by a judge who instinc-
tively goes furthest in accepting the most restrictive claims of governmental au-
thorities. The task of this Court, as of other courts, is to "hold the balance true
Id. at 2333-34.
The Brennan dissent concluded by stating that:
Rights secured by the Fourth Amendment are particularly difficult to pro-
tect because their "advocates are usually criminals." But the rules "we fashion
[are] for the innocent and guilty alike." By replacing Aguilar and Spinelli with a
test that provides no assurance that magistrates, rather than the police, or infor-
mants, will make determinations of probable cause; imposes no structure on
magistrates' probable cause inquiries; and invites the possibility that intrusions
may be justified on less than reliable information from an honest or credible
person, today's decision threatens to "obliterate one of the most fundamental
distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law,
and the police-state where they are the law."
Id. at 2359 (citations omitted).
130. Justice Stevens was concerned that the informant had predicted that Sue Gates
would fly back after she dropped the car off in Florida when in fact she left West Palm
Beach with her husband in the Mercury. Id. at 2360 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. The dissent pointed out that the informant had predicted an itinerary that always
kept one spouse in Bloomingdale, supposedly guarding the contraband. However, that could
not be the case, Justice Stevens reasoned, "when it was known that the pair was actually
together over a thousand miles from home." Id.
132. Justice Stevens reasoned that it would have been unusual if, as predicted, Sue
Gates had driven to West Palm, left the car, and flown right back to Illinois. But the mere
fact that she was in West Palm with the car (for possibly a month before her husband
arrived, see id. at n.1), joined her husband, and drove north together the next morning "are
neither unusual nor probative of criminal activity." Id. at 2360.
133. Id. The majority rebutted by stating that "[wie have never required that infor-
mants used by the police be infallible, and can see no reason to impose such a requirement
in this case. Probable cause, particularly when police have obtained a warrant, simply does
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Furthermore, in his view, "the judgment of three levels of state
courts, all of whom are better able to evaluate the probable relia-
bility of anonymous informants in Bloomingdale, Illinois, than we
are, should be entitled to at least a presumption of accuracy.""13
Finally, Justice Stevens reasoned, because "'there is a constitu-
tional difference between houses and cars' ,,135 that the car search
should be reconsidered "in the light of our intervening decision in
United States v. Ross.""'
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF Gates
The conclusion in Gates was correct; the warrant approving
the search of the Gates's house and car should be upheld, but that
could have been accomplished without abandoning the rules enun-
ciated in Aguilar and Spinelli.
The majority contradicts itself in two important respects.
First, it admonishes decisions after Spinelli for being too "rigid"
and "unpractical," yet concedes that the original phrasing of Agui-
lar was not so inflexible: "[W]e intended neither a rigid compart-
mentalization of the inquiries . . nor that these inquiries be elab-
orate exegeses of an informant's tip." The Court points out that
Aguilar required only some underlying facts.1 37 Although Spinelli
conceivably evolved the two-pronged test into a more "rigid" stan-
dard, the Court nonetheless cites Adams v. Williams,"8 a post-
Spinelli decision, where the Court reasserted the proposition, as
the majority states it, that "[r]igid legal rules are ill-suited to an
area of such diversity."' 89 If the majority is suggesting that
Spinelli was wrongly decided or that lower courts have misapplied
its standards, it should say so. 140 The Gates Court would have bet-
ter complied with its judicial responsibility had it clarified Spinelli
in light of Draper and subsequent cases. A strong admonishment,
not require the perfection the dissent finds necessary." Id. at 2335 n.14. The majority also
reasoned that it was unlikely that the issuing magistrate relied on the theory advanced by
the dissent that one spouse would always stay at home in order to guard the contraband. Id.
134. Id. at 2361-62 (footnote omitted).
135. Id. at 2361 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970)).
136. Id. at 2362. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982), held that when police legit-
imately stop an automobile and have probable cause to believe that contraband is contained
within it, they can conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle.
137. 103 S. Ct. at 2328 n.6.
138. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
139. 103 S. Ct. at 2329.
140. The majority itself concedes that the decision in Spinelli has been criticized con-
siderably. See id. at 2332 n.11 and accompanying citation.
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such as the one given by the Court in Ventresca, would have re-
solved the problem; abandoning Aguilar and Spinelli did not.
Second, the Court states that a finding of probable cause may
be based on a tip from an informant "known for the unusual relia-
bility of his predictions" or from "an unquestionably honest citi-
zen," even if the report thoroughly fails to set forth the basis upon
which the information was obtained. " If this is so, a similar state-
ment from an honest police officer may also support a finding of
probable cause. But that would go against the teachings of Na-
thanson and Jones, cases expressly reaffirmed by the Court," that
mere conclusory statements by officers without any statement of
adequate underlying facts cannot support a finding of probable
cause. Similarly, Nathanson and Giordenello directly contradict
the Court's suggestion that a strong showing on one prong of the
Aguilar test should compensate for a deficient showing on the
other." 3 How the majority can expressly reaffirm such cases, yet
implicitly reject their teachings, is without reason.
As Justice White stated in concurrence, "it is not at all neces-
sary to overrule Aquilar-Spinelli in order to reverse the judgment
below." 14' The corroboration of facts in Gates sufficiently estab-
lished the veracity of the anonymous informant. The tip predicted
that Sue Gates would drive to Florida, that Lance would fly there a
few days after May 3, and that Lance would then drive the car
back. After the police corroborated these facts,14 5 the magistrate
could reasonably have inferred that the informant, who had spe-
cific knowledge of these unusual travel plans, did not make up his
story and that he obtained his information in a reliable way. It is
enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that " 'corrobora-
tion through other sources of information reduced the chances of a
reckless or prevaricating tale.' "140 Furthermore, the corroborated
activity was quite suspicious. 147 In any event, however, the major-ity's use of Draper, where only innocent details were corroborated,
141. Id. at 2329.
142. See id. at 2332.
143. See id. at 2358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2350.
145. There was one inaccuracy in the tip; however, the Court has "never required that
informants used by the police be infallible. ... Id. at 2335 n.14; See supra pp. 895-96 &
notes 130-33.
146. Id. at 2335 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 271 (1960)).
147. "Lance Gates' flight to Palm Beach, an area known to be a source of narcotics, the
brief overnight stay in a motel, and apparent immediate return North, suggest a pattern
that trained law-enforcement officers have recognized as indicative of illicit drug-dealing
activity." 103 S. Ct. at 2348 (footnote omitted).
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resolves this quandary. The corroboration in Gates "is as trustwor-
thy as a tip which would pass Aguilar's test without independent
corroboration."
1 48
Finally, assuming that corroboration could not satisfy the "ba-
sis of knowledge" prong,149 the detail in the tip was certainly suffi-
cient to assure the issuing magistrate that he was "relying on
something more substantial than a casual rumor circulating in the
underworld or an accusation based merely on an individual's gen-
eral reputation.' 150 Using Draper as a "benchmark,' 151 the detail
in Gates was at least as great.'52 Although theoretically the tip in
Gates could have been supplied by a "vindictive travel agent," this
is not determinative because "only the probability, and not a
prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of proba-
ble cause.'
1 53
Hence, the warrant in Gates could have been upheld within
the Aguilar-Spinelli rubric. Accordingly, the majority's proposition
that "anonymous tips seldom would be of . . . value in police
work" is weakened. While a rigid application of Aguilar and
Spinelli would diminish the value of tips from anonymous infor-
mants as well as confidential informants, a more flexible standard,
following more closely the intent of the Aguilar court, as discussed
above, would validate tips such as the one in Gates, while ferreting
out those not worthy of such merit.
V. THE IMPLICATIONS OF Gates
The decision in Gates is a paradox, full of conflicting ideals.
Preferring to leave for another day the issue whether the exclu-
sionary rule should be modified,'54 the Court instead chose to re-
ject a long standing and successful standard for evaluating infor-
mants' tips,155 Informants, especially anonymous ones, should be
148. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415 (1969).
149. Justice White believed that it could. "If, however, as in Draper, the police corrobo-
rate information from which it can be inferred that the informant's tip was grounded on
inside information, this corroboration is sufficient to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong."
103 S. Ct. at 2349 n.22; see supra note 89.
150. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. at 416.
151. Id.
152. See supra notes 3 and 87.
153. Id. at 419; see 103 S. Ct. at 2349 (White, J., concurring).
154. 103 S. Ct. at 2321-25. See id. at 2336-47 (White, J., concurring) (addressing the
exclusionary rule issue and suggesting that it be modified).
155. Although the Court refused to modify the exclusionary rule, holding that that is-
sue was not properly before it, it can be argued that by abandoning Aguilar and Spinelli
and substituting the more lenient "totality of the circumstances" test, the same result (mod-
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classified as presumptively unreliable.1 5 6 Informants are frequently
themselves criminals, drug addicts, or liars who give information
for reasons other than the call of civic duty. The reasons motivat-
ing informants include offers of immunity or sentence reductions,
promises of money payments, revenge, or the hope of eliminating
criminal competition.'51 It is unreasonable that these "presump-
tively" reliable statements from informants, without an explana-
tion as to how they obtained their information, can provide a basis
for probable cause, while the same statement from an officer will
not. An informant may have provided adequate information in the
past but may subsequently give information for some ulterior pur-
pose. Thus, there is even more reason to apply veracity and basis-
of-knowledge standards to tips from anonymous infor-
mants-nothing is known about their reliability.
By enlarging the scope of informant evidence, society's inter-
est in unintruded privacy takes a back seat in an important re-
spect. The decision in Gates will "restore the preeminence and
concomitant abuse of informant's tips by law enforcement offi-
cials. ' 158 No longer will officers be required to supply the issuing
magistrate with the underlying circumstances surrounding the in-
formants' veracity and basis of knowledge; information on either of
these bases will suffice if the issuing magistrate is convinced that in
the totality of the circumstances probable cause has been
established.
This can lead to extreme abuses. Warrants can be issued on
the mere fact that a known informant was previously reliable. In
addition, Gates will provide an opportunity for officers to fabricate
informants, if the establishment of probable cause would otherwise
fail, because the informants' reliability will no longer be closely
scrutinized, as is the reliability of the officer.' 59 The possible
ification of the exclusionary rule) was achieved as to informants. See 103 S. Ct. at 2338.
156. See Comment, supra note 4, at 107. See generally Comment, The Undisclosed
Informant and the Fourth Amendment: A Search for Meaningful Standards, 81 YALE L.J.
703 (1972) (suggesting a probable cause model for assuring the credibility of incriminating
information obtained from unidentified informants); The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83
HARV. L. REv. 62, 177 (1969) (examination of Spinelli and its requirement of independent
corroboration).
157. See Comment, supra note 156, at 712-13.
158. Comment, supra note 4, at 121. See Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir.
1966) (en banc) In Lankford, police used unverified anonymous tips to search for two fugi-
tives in more than 300 houses, most belonging to blacks. Officers carrying shotguns con-
ducted the majority of the searches without consent, at around 2:00 a.m. The officers awak-
ened individuals, including children, with shining flashlights.
159. See supra text accompanying note 142.
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abuses from anonymous informants is even greater. Consequently,
the most alarming result from Gates is that it once again presents
the question, answered affirmatively thirty-six years ago in John-
son v. United States,60 whether a "neutral and detached magis-
trate" will make probable cause determinations rather than the
"officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime," or worse yet, whether an anonymous informant will make
the determination. By requiring police to provide certain crucial
information to the issuing magistrate and by structuring the mag-
istrate's probable cause inquiries, the Aguilar and Spinelli frame-
work assured the magistrate's independent role as the only arbiter
of probable cause determinations.
That some courts may have been overly technical in their ap-
plication of Aguilar and Spinelli is no justification for rejecting
Aguilar and Spinelli outright. Rather, the Court in Gates could
have clarified those cases and their interaction with Draper.16 ' It
also could have admonished the lower courts for being overly tech-
nical and rigid in applying Aguilar and Spinelli, instructing these
courts on their proper application. If we are to continue to ensure
that findings of probable cause, and their attendant intrusions, are
based on information provided by a credible person who acquired
the information in a reliable way, then the Aquilar-Spine li stan-
dard, albeit in a less rigid form, must be revived, or a similar stan-
dard developed and applied to informants' tips, especially those
from anonymous informants.
VI. CONCLUSION
Gates is just another example of the Supreme Court chipping
away at the protections that the fourth amendment" 2 guarantees,
while at the same time giving lip service to its meaning. It is evi-
dent that the pendulum is swinging toward the extreme right;
crime control is becoming the model at the expense of individial
rights. How long this trend will continue before the fourth amend-
ment is left valueless is anyone's guess.' 3 Perhaps the fourth
160. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
161. See 103 S. Ct. at 2350-51.
162. Or, as Justice Brennan put it, "stop dead in its tracks judicial development of
Fourth Amendment rights." United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 554 (1975) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
163. This movement of the constitutional pendulum continued during the Supreme
Court's 1983-84 term. The movement was particularly noticeable with fourth amendment
jurisprudence. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984); Massachusetts v.
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amendment will regain its value when Justice Rehnquist and his
ultra-conservative policies leave the Court. Maybe then the pendu-
lum will swing back and the Aguilar-Spinelli standard will be res-
urrected or a similar one developed. But in the meantime, may
Aguilar and Spinelli rest in peace.
ALEXANDER PENELAS
Sheppard, 104 S. Ct. 3424 (1984) (the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule should not be
applied when law enforcement officials conducting the search act in objectively reasonable
reliance on a search Warrant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, that subse-
quently is determined to be invalid; this is often referred to as the "good faith" exception);
Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984) (Court adopted an "inevitable discovery" exception
to the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule).
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